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Abstract 
The exposure of Libya’s political fragmentation and societal disintegration after 2011 
was picked up by academics, journalists, and policy researchers who have written on that 
aspect of the Libyan reality more than any other. Libya is perceived as a fragile state with 
hundreds of armed groups, multiple claims of governance and tens of warring tribes. Both 
local and international actors have contributed to this image, but this thesis attempts to argue 
that there is more than the fragile and disorganized state discourse to describe Libya. The fact 
that Libyan unity, sovereignty, and independence have survived this extreme level of 
fragmentation is a question that deserves to be investigated. Thus, through the use of wide-
range of theories, academic and policy papers, news articles, survey data, and political 
agreements reports, this thesis aims to answer why and how Libya managed to preserve its 
status as a state in such an environment.  
It treats the question as a question of sovereignty by arguing that the traditional 
definition of sovereignty limits our ability to comprehend the state issue in Libya fully. By 
focusing on different aspects of sovereignty and by selecting broader definitions of the 
concept, this thesis argues that Libya’s unity and sovereignty have been preserved so far 
because international and local actors benefit from this arrangement even though they may be 
(in)directly contributing to fragmentation in the country. The international community is not 
willing to let states fall-apart, and the Libyan people do not seem to favor division and 
separation movements. Local state and non-state actors realize this arrangement, and they 
have not challenged thus far. 
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 4 
Introduction 
Few scholars have researched Libyan history, politics, culture, and economics, let 
alone Libyan sovereignty and statehood. Academic production on the country can go easily 
unnoticed if compared to books and articles on Egypt, Turkey, or other countries in the 
MENA region. Recently, the country has received more attention after the events of 2011 and 
the NATO-led intervention that has assisted the rebels in their mission to bring about an end 
to Gaddafi’s regime. Academic and policy publications on the country increased rapidly and 
contributed to shaping the new image of Libya — one of fragmentation, conflict and civil 
war. 
In a year-long process of research, I have learned many surprising, yet interesting 
facts about the causes of fragmentation in Libya. The most critical among them is that the 
disorganization of the Libyan state after 2011 is not only a cause of the uprising, but rather a 
reaction to forty years of divide and rule policies. Colonel Gaddafi has intentionally kept 
Libya ‘stateless,’ weakened its public institutions, and created rifts among the Libyan society 
to ward off threats away from the regime. Post-2011 developments have further advanced 
political and regional fragmentation in Libya. The inability of different contesting groups to 
work together and to agree on a single political framework has proved damaging. Further, the 
existence of hundreds of armed groups have escalated the level of disorganization in Libya. 
In the last seven years, Libya has witnessed the collapse of multiple governments, 
simultaneous claims of governance, cycles of local and regional conflicts, the fall of state 
institutions in the hand of revolutionary groups, and many violent local and tribal clashes1.  
Nonetheless, one thing has remained a mystery, and it kept my mind busy throughout 
the learning process. I wondered how is it possible that Libya did not fall apart as a result of 
this extreme level of political and local fragmentation. What factors have sustained Libya, its 
borders, and its unity in the face of all these challenges? Also, what compels the three 
historical regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan to remain united as one country in 
such a discontented environment? 
These questions continued to entertain my thoughts until I knew that this is what I 
should write about. Thus, this thesis will attempt to explain why and how Libya has 
maintained its independence as a united country with fixed borders despite the extreme 
fragmentation and disorganization that the country has been going through.  
                                                        
1 An analysis of the causes of fragmentation in Libya will be presented in the Historical Background. 
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By focusing on the idea of  sovereignty, this theses aims to show that a combination 
of changes, developments, and factors on the international and the local stage have 
contributed to preserving the state in Libya. More specifically, it argues that Libyan unity is a 
function of the convergence of international and national interests. Both local and external 
dominant players have indeed contributed to preserving and recreating the ideals and the 
image of the state in Libya, for ‘unity’ better served, and continues to serve, the pursuit of 
their goals.   
The hypothesis will be further developed throughout the thesis which starts with a 
literature review followed by a theoretical framework and a methodology section. A 
historical overview chapter precedes the analysis which consists of three chapters. Each 
chapter will focus on a specific group of actors. The first focuses on international community 
efforts, which includes the UN and its support mission in Libya, Western and European 
powers with interests in the country, and Arab states. The second chapter is on revolutionary 
and armed groups. The chapter analyzes how Libya’s revolutionary groups threaten their 
interests by challenging ‘unity’ and sovereignty. It presents a case study of a conflict between 
the Libyan National Army and the Government of National Accord to support this 
hypothesis. Finally, the third chapter on the tribes and traditional authorities examines how 
tribes in Libya have contributed to strengthen the ‘unity’ and sovereignty discourse in order 
to preserve their interests and political standing. The whole arguments are then summarized 
in a brief conclusion with which the thesis ends. 
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Problematizing Libyan ‘Unity’ 
Literature Review: Libyan Sovereignty in Perspective 
 
 The central question of this thesis is why Libya managed to stay as one united country 
despite the high level of political, societal, and even territorial fragmentation. Academic 
productions on Libyan modern history, its rentier nature, and authoritarian regime shows that 
fragmentation is not a post-2011 development. Instead, Gaddafi and  his associates have 
planted the seeds for divisions and statelessness much before the 2011 Uprisings, yet these 
policies have not managed to bring about the total disintegration of Libya.  
Youssef Mohammed Sawani explains that despite Gaddafi’s claims of direct 
democracy, the leader continued to favor patron-client relationships, nepotism, and favoritism 
over public administration and local governance mechanisms. Instead of serving ordinary 
Libyans, the administration under Gaddafi functioned for the benefits of the Colonel and his 
clients. As a result, the weak state institutions and public administration structures were 
unable to implement policies nationally, or coordinate with local governance bodies at the 
municipalities’ level without Gaddafi’s approval2. Furthermore, Libya is an ideal example of 
a rentier state with no social contract to maintain the relationship between the regime and the 
population. A brief discussion of the rentier state in Libya is key to understand how Libyan 
sovereignty was ‘constructed.’ 
Camilla Sandbakken, who chose Libya, Niger, and Algeria as her case studies, 
explains that the economic conditions of rentier states determine the range of political choices 
available for their governments. In principle, rentier states do not have to depend on taxes 
from their populations to cover for state financial obligations. Thus, populations in rentier 
states get little representation at the political level. However, governments can gain 
legitimacy through government spending, subsidizing different sections of the economy such 
as health, education, employment, infrastructure, forming patron-client networks, and by 
offering public sector and management jobs based on political loyalties rather than merits. 
Citizens come to depend directly on the state for income. Furthermore, Oil rents - which are 
delivered directly to the state -  allows it to buy-off or suppress political opposition. A side 
effect is the increase of corruption and the lack of accountability and transparency3.   
                                                        
2 Youssef Mohammed Sawan, “Public Administration in Libya: Continuity and Change,” International Journal of 
Public Administration, 2017, P. 809. 
3 Camilla Sandbakken, “The Limits to Democracy Posed by Oil Rentier States: The Case of Algeria, Nigeria, and 
Libya,” Democratisation, 2006, P. 135-140. 
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Additionally, oil rentier states do not usually have a middle class that is independent 
of the regime to resist it. Libya had no civil society or technocrats under Gaddafi. Their 
power and numbers were marginalized after a coup attempt in 1975. The religious and the 
academic community were gradually neutralized into the system, and the oppositions groups 
in exile do not enjoy much legitimacy among Libyans. Consequently, political competition 
can only occur through the control of oil resources. When opposition groups or oppressed 
civilians gain access to oil, it is unlikely that they will discard it4.  
Sandbakken concludes that wealth from oil, among other factors, creates a social 
contract that is not favorable to democracy. “The combination of welfare expenditure, 
repression and the fragmentation of the social structure has made a transition to democracy 
highly unlikely.5” Libya’s abundant oil resources, have indirectly advanced a sovereignty 
framework different from the Westphalian norm. The rentier nature of Libya, has shaped the 
development of sovereignty and unity in the country and contributed to their consolidation 
after independence.  
As in other rentier states in the region, Libya has an overstaffed misfunctioning public 
sector. The post-2011 transitional authorities faced the challenges of governing a country 
with an inefficient system of public administration. Regardless of its ineffectiveness, the 
public sector remained to be the biggest employer in Libya. At the eve of the revolution, 85% 
of the Libyan workforce served as civil servants in different capacities that range from 
security to education6.  In addition, the decline of oil rents, Libya's sole economic resource, 
after the uprisings resulted in more massive deficits, higher public debt and eroding foreign 
reserves7.  
As a reaction to the crisis, transition governments opted to dismiss most of the 
planned or partially implemented pre-2011 reform policies. The result was that that the public 
sector expanded by putting all armed groups under the government’s payroll and the 
contraction of governance space left for local authorities. “Libya is currently dominated - and 
its resources are squandered by - a multitude of non-state actors. This has had the effect of 
bringing the state to near collapse. The most substantial power currently lies outside the 
formal system.8 
 For Sawani, the failure of transitional governments to reform state institutions is 
partially due to the mismanagement of the former regime that has weakened these institutions 
                                                        
4 Ibid. 
5 Id, P. 146 
6 Sawani, P. 809-810 
7 Id, P. 813 
8 Id, P. 816. 
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capacities and burdened their payroll. The exhaustion of public administration structures was 
further exacerbated by the events following the uprisings and by thousands of armed men 
who were expecting financial rewards for their revolt against Gaddafi9. The pressing need of 
non-state actors to access and control state economic resources, meant that Libyan internal 
sovereignty was breached and its territorial unity threatened by the multiple local warring 
parties. 
In “Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building,” Wolfram Lacher argues 
that a group of locals composed of armed group leaders, businessmen, tribal and community 
elders is involved in power struggles to seize state power and resources and prevent its 
consolidation10. These elites benefited from and contributed to Libya’s state dissolution, 
territorial fragmentation, and loss of control over constituents and territory; nevertheless, they 
still hold the key for the reestablishment of central authority11.  
Lacher explains that these elites have three long-term options: they either empower 
the state and themselves at the same time, form an alliance that exerts control at the national 
level, or consolidate power locally and prevents the return of the country. Their choice relies 
on their dependence and connection to the state. On the one hand, elites who are dependent 
on the state for financial resources, or whose activities require the emergence of stability and 
peace in Libya will tend to choose one of the first two options. On the other hand, elites who 
benefit from the absence of the state, such as smugglers, armed gangs, and warlords who try 
to control Libyan oil resources, will tend to prefer the last option12.   
Lacher, as Sawani, agrees that the uprisings have not primarily caused rifts and 
struggles between local elites. Gaddafi intentionally prevented the emergence of state 
institutions, except for the security apparatus, and ruled the country by exploiting local, 
regional and tribal strife. Thus, community rifts played a significant role during the 2011 
uprisings. Some community figures decided to support the revolution, while other supported 
Gaddafi. Elites from cities that supported the uprisings, such as Misrata, were heavily 
represented in transitional governments, while those who opposed it were excluded from the 
political table13. 
 The GNA (Government of National Accord) that was formulated in 2015 by a UN 
and international initiative did not and could not intervene to put an end to local power 
                                                        
9 Id, P. 816-817. 
10 Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Local Elites and the Politics of Alliance Building,” Mediterranean Politics, 2015, P. 
64. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Id, P. 65-66. 
13 Lacher, P. 80-81. 
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struggles and community disintegration because it came under the mercy of these diverse 
local elites from the very moment it entered Libya. Lacher, admits the historical factor for 
Libya’s fragmentation, but he established that the GNA and its institution had become the 
victim of local elites’ competition for power and resources14. It’s not only the GNA that has 
become a victim of the local conflicts, revolutionary groups, and regional interests. Libyan 
sovereignty and unity has become a victim to these developments that continue to threaten 
statehood in the country.  
A common aspect of all works reviewed here is that the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 was a 
shock that unleashed local, regional and tribal grief. These communities’ rifts that have been 
used by Gaddafi as a policy to rule the country for more than forty years resulted in the 
massive fragmentation of the Libyan societal and political landscape once Gaddafi was 
removed from the picture. However, Libya’s severe disintegration did not result in dividing 
the country, and the idea does not seem to hold substantial merits among Libyans citizens 
who seem to be attached to their country’s identity regardless of their political aspirations.  
Ariel Ahram holds that sovereignty in Middle Eastern states has always been tenuous. 
Arab countries enjoyed legitimacy at the international level, but their legitimacy was 
constantly contested internally by some of the population. This is not to claim that the 
legitimacy of the state itself has been contested, the people usually accept that state but not 
the regimes that govern them. Ahram gives Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq as countries where this 
acceptance of the state but not the government is apparent15.  
Efforts to dissolute the state, fragment or legally divide it has failed thus far. For 
example, even though some elites from Cyrenaica in Libya have attempted to restore the first 
Libyan constitutions in which the three regions were treated separately, and each had its 
federal government, their efforts were in vain. The ground of their demands is that Cyrenaica 
is the oil-rich region of Libya, while its population has been denied access to the benefits of 
oil for a long time. Nevertheless, this group of elites was not able to mobilize enough people 
behind their cause16.  
Finally, Ahram agrees that the international order today prefers to preserve the status 
quo which makes the creation of new states out of existing ones extremely rare. Thus, 
international powers will continue the rhetoric of helping and supporting de jure states to 
achieve de facto control over their territories17.  
                                                        
14 Ibid. 
15 Ariel I. Ahram, “Territory, Sovereignty, and the New Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa,” The 
Middle East Journal, 2017, P. 348-349 
16 Id, P. 354-358 
17 Id, P. 362 
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Louise Fawcett maintains that the territorial unit in Middle Eastern states is likely to 
survive, but the control of borders and sources of internal authority might become 
fragmented. According to the author this state of affairs has already prevailed in Libya. He 
adds that a critical feature of fragile states is their inability to exert power within its borders 
and the sources of its internal authority get divided along regional and local lines leaving 
massive proportions of state territory ‘governmentally empty.18’ 
Accordingly, these states become characterized by conflict, porous borders, and 
fragmented governance. Regardless, Fawcett stresses that “most citizens of the Middle East 
today identify with ‘their’ state alongside other tribal, religious, or ethnic associations.19” 
Furthermore, the majority of domestic actors who contribute to political disorder and contest 
with government mechanisms, in countries such as Libya, actually describe the preservation 
of state borders as a top priority. Fawcett concludes that the most likely scenario constitutes 
of a long period of conflict and instability, but it is unlikely that a change in state borders will 
occur in any Arab country, even in cases of extreme political disorder such as  Libya20.   
William Zartman clarifies that the collapse of the state in Libya cannot be attributed 
to the Arab Spring. He contends that Libya and other Arab countries were already hollow on 
the inside before the uprisings. The collapse of responsible governance in the Arab world that 
happened many years before the Arab Spring led to the emergence and the strengthening of 
identity politics and local, religious and tribal affiliations, not the other way around. This 
trend continued and intensified after the uprisings because the Libyan state was not able to 
recover from the sudden regime change21.  
Nonetheless, Zartman, as Fawcett and Ahram, believes that Libya will not be carved 
into three separate states based on regional divisions. Even though it has been argued that 
Tripolitania belongs to the Maghreb, Fezzan to Africa and Cyrenaica to Egypt, they have not 
become parts of these regions still. Their politics might be affected by surrounding areas, but 
they do not take precedence over their position as part of Libya. The borders that were 
created in 1951 have shaped Libya and the Libyan national identity, and they are likely to 
remain intact22.  
 
 
                                                        
18 Louise Fawcett, “States and Sovereignty in the Middle East: Myths and Realities,” International Affairs, 2017, 
P. 794-796.  
19 Id, P. 797 
20 Id, P. 805-807 
21 William Zartman, “States, Boundaries, and Sovereignty in the Middle East: Unsteady But Unchanging,” 
International Affairs, 2017, P. 941-944. 
22 Id, P. 939-940 
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Sovereignty and ‘Unity’: A Theoretical Framework 
 
The question of why Libya remains a united country with unchanging boundaries 
despite the extreme level of fragmentation is a question of sovereignty. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines sovereignty as “supreme authority within a territory. It is 
a modern notion of political authority… The state is the political institution in which 
sovereignty is embodied23.” Meaning that, sovereignty is the supreme authority of the state 
within its legal boundaries. Taking this traditional definition of sovereignty into account, 
begs the question of why Libya has not disintegrated yet. Consequently, there is a need to 
expand the definitions of sovereignty and statehood to answer why Libya is still a widely 
recognized sovereign state that exist within fixed borders. This puzzle will be analyzed based 
on recent theories on sovereignty and the state that have been developed to fit the new world 
order.  
 
• Sovereignty in the New World Order 
In Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World, Robert H. 
Jackson argues that the traditional understanding of sovereignty can no longer be applied to 
the post World War II international order – especially in quasi-states. A characteristic of 
quasi-states is that “their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional 
authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic 
welfare24.” Libya can be thought of as quasi-state according to this definition. The country 
lacked institutional authority and organized power even before 2011. This lack of central 
power has become more emphasized after the uprising 2011. Another attribute of quasi-
states, such as the case in Libya,  is that they lack established institutions that can outlast the 
individuals who occupy them25, and enjoy uncontested international recognition but their 
populations do not possess the benefits that are usually associated with independence and 
statehood26.  
However, the weakness of states is no longer an invitation for foreign intervention or 
justification for international support of rebel, armed, or revolutionary groups. States can no 
longer be deprived of their right to independence, territorial unity, or sovereignty even if they 
are going through internal wars and conflicts and despite their disorganization or regime 
                                                        
23 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/#1  
24 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, P. 21.  
25 Id, P. 22. 
26 Id, P. 21 
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illegitimacy27. Furthermore, weak states are not perceived as an international threat anymore. 
Instead, they present an opportunity and valid grounds for positive assistance and support28. 
Assisted by this theory, the same concept holds true in Libya, where the international 
community has intervened in multiple occasions to help maintain Libyan unity and prevent 
the escalation of disintegration.  
To allow one country to fall apart means unleashing a process of separation 
movements around the world which will directly threaten the established international order. 
Thus, more developed states are now willing to provide economic and security support to 
prevent more state failures. The protection of the moral and legal framework of the state 
system has become a priority for the UN and the international community29.   
Recent developments at the international stage have contributed to the development of 
two distinctive types of sovereignty; negative and positive. Negative sovereignty entails 
freedom from outside interference and a legal and formal right to exist30. On the other hand, 
positive sovereignty means that a state can use the advantages of their existence and 
independence to engage in state-building activities31. Keeping these two different forms of 
sovereignty in mind, Libya can be categorized as negative sovereignty since it ensures its 
independence based on international laws. The International community can provide Libya 
with the former, but it cannot ensure the latter as “state-building is primarily a domestic 
process occurring over a long period of time that can only be brought about by the combined 
wills, efforts, and responsibilities of governments and populations32.” Thus if Libya wanted 
to achieve positive sovereignty, the population as well as the representative should engage in 
a domestic state-building process.  
 
• The Symbolic Aspect of Sovereignty and Statehood 
In addition to expanding on the theory of sovereignty, there is a need to make a 
distinction between the symbolic and the physical realm and another between the state as an 
object and the state as a subject when trying to answer how and why Libya has survived 
political disorganization and rebel groups to this day.  
In his collection of lectures On the State, which were published in a book with the 
same title, Pierre Bourdieu explains that the way societies perceive the state is the product of 
                                                        
27 Id, P. 23.  
28 Id, P. 26-27 
29 Id, P. 42-44. 
30 Id, P. 27. 
31 Id. P. 29. 
32 Id, P. 21.  
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the state itself and that is why the concept of the “state” composes a perplexing notion. He 
claims that “if we have particular difficulty in thinking this object, it is because - and I weigh 
my words - almost unthinkable33.” But as a provisional description to build on, Bourdieu 
articulates that the state can be considered as “the sector of the field of power, which may be 
called “administrative field” or “field of public office’, this sector that we particularly have in 
mind when we speak of ‘state’ without further precision, is defined by possession of 
monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence34.”  
The addition of the symbolic realm to the mix is what makes Bourdieu’s model stand 
out. For Bourdieu, the monopoly of symbolic violence is a precondition for the possession 
and the exercise of physical violence. Advancing the idea that the state has only power over 
the material is not enough because public order is built on consent rather than coercive power 
solely - consent itself is a symbolic gesture35.  
Bourdieu goes further to reject the definition that Marxists including Marx, Gramsci, 
and Althusser give to the state. The Marxist interpretation of the state is “an apparatus of 
constraint, of maintenance of public order” that is geared towards the benefit of the dominant 
class and not the citizenry. Bourdieu’s rejection is based on the ground that the Marxists 
explain the state according to its functions and practices, but they do not indicate what the 
actual structures and mechanisms of the state are. Mechanisms are those whose duty to 
produce the foundation of the state itself. He insists that nothing will be learned on the state if 
we continue to define it by it is functions36.  
Bourdieu makes a clear distinction between the two meanings for the word state in 
dictionaries: the first identifies the state as bureaucratic apparatus that manages public or 
collective interests; the second is a territory with artificial boundaries on which the authority 
of the apparatus as mentioned above is exercised37. For Bourdieu, the second has to come 
before the first. When we think of states, we give priority to the first, but for Bourdieu, this is 
irrational because nationalism at its basic sense arms itself with linguistic and cultural unity, 
not administration and ministries, however, they achieve administration through establishing 
a state38.  
                                                        
33 Pierre Bourdieu, On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992, Polity Press, 2014, P. 3. 
34 Id, P. 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Id, P. 4-6. 
37 Id, P. 31. 
38 Id, P. 124. 
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To sum up, Bourdieu’s state is “a hidden principle that can be grasped in the 
manifestation of public order understood in both the physical and the symbolic sense39.” 
Citizens, state agents and non-state actors all experience the state and recreate it through their 
most basic physical and symbolic activities. This thought is central to this thesis as Libya is 
still a country where the state idea persists in people’s lives symbolically despite the intense 
level of fragmentation. For example, Libyans continue to prefer legitimate state security 
providers to militia and armed groups even though the former lacks the resources and the 
ability that the latter enjoys40. Further, almost all non-state actors, such as the armed groups 
and the tribes, are dependent on the state for funding and resources41 — an arrangement 
which makes the state more present symbolically. The analysis that follows will attempt to 
explain how Libyans continue to perceive the state as the legitimate power holder even 
though a multitude of local actors effectively controls the country.  
 
• The Symbolic in Performative Sovereignty  
Jose Martinez and Brent Eng hold that their understanding of the state drifts from the 
commonly accepted conception of the state that focuses on the institutionalization of power. 
They criticize this approach because it creates a discrepancy between state and society and 
they conceal the daily deeds through which political authority is accomplished. Thus, they 
instead focus on the symbolic activities and technologies of governance that make 
governmental authorities tangible and thinkable42.  
Martinez and Eng ‘theorize political authority, whether enshrined in the state or a 
rebel government, as an assemblage produced through everyday acts intended to convince an 
audience of particular sovereign arrangements43.’ In other words, they focus on everyday 
practices that recreate the existence of the state, and how rebel groups or existing regimes use 
these practices to shape political loyalties and consolidate their authorities.  
Their framework is based on Alex Jeffrey’s concept of “performing the state” (2013) 
for him performing the activities of the state has been one of the most critical measures for 
both non-state actors and incumbent authorities that seek their defeat. These practices play a 
crucial role because if performed successfully, they foster legitimacy and demonstrate an 
                                                        
39 Id, P. 4. 
40 Floor El Kamouni-Janssen et al. “Local Security Governance in Libya: Perceptions of Security and Protection 
in a Fragmented Country,” The Clingendael Institute, October 2018, P. 27-28: 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/diversity_security_Libya.pdf  
41 Ibid. 
42 Jose Ciro Martinez and Brent Eng, “Stifling Stateness: The Assad regime’s campaign against rebel 
governance,” Security Dialogue, 2018, P. 236. 
43 Ibid.  
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ability to govern but if failed, they result in more considerable dissatisfaction and resentment. 
Certain practices carry larger symbolic weight than others especially ones that are connected 
with specific historical manifestation of authority in a given place and time44.  
The two scholars also observe that reliance on force is not a long-term strategy that 
can foster allegiance among a specific population; it is a precondition but not an end goal. If 
non-state actors want to challenge the state, they should focus on the provision of services 
and the establishment of state institutions. Effective governance is more critical for rebel 
groups than it is to state actors since they cannot take the affiliations of citizens with them for 
granted45.  
This theory of rebel governance and performative sovereignty will be applied to 
Libya. The security vacuum created by the rapid disintegration of the Libyan army during the 
uprising allowed revolutionary and armed groups to attempt to fill the void. The actions of 
armed and revolutionary groups to perform the state have problematized and weakened 
central authority46, but the question remains whether their efforts had tangible results and 
whether they were able to break the bond between state and society. Most importantly, the 
application of rebel governance theories on the situation in Libya will contribute to the larger 
picture and will provide insights on whether armed groups are a threat to Libyan unity and 
existence. This will be further discussed in chapter two in this thesis.  
 
• Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab World 
Gokhan Bacik presents another challenge to the endured meaning of sovereignty in 
his book Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and 
Iraq.  
Gokhan Bacik suggests that the definition of sovereignty does not fit in the Arab 
Middle East. Instead, he proposes the concept of hybrid sovereignty as an alternative 
approach that is more applicable to Arab countries. Bacik’s main argument is that when the 
western model of sovereignty and nation states was injected into the Middle East after the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and up until the end of World War II, it had to cohabit the 
same space as traditional institutions that have their effect on politics and culture47.  
In Libya, the tribes, religious sects, and public and local authorities are all examples 
of these institutions. Traditional authorities had to adapt and transform in reaction to the new 
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realities, but they did not cease to exist. The use of Bacik’s theory will help demonstrate that 
sub-national identities did not emerge suddenly in post-2011 Libya. They existed before the 
Libyan independence in 1951, and they have evolved and played different roles since then, 
depending on their relationship to political power holders during the Monarchy, Gaddafi 
reign, and post-2011 transition governments and national bodies. The realization that these 
identities have a history of coexistence with the nation-state in Libya will assist in explaining 
their role in the Libyan conflict and their relationship to the state. 
Furthermore, the concept of hybrid sovereignty can help explain that sub-national groups, 
such as the tribes in Libya, do not always challenge state authority and they are not 
necessarily against the nation-state, they seek ways to accommodate their interests with the 
national framework. They become a threat to national unity and stability when their interests 
conflict with state interests48. Drawing on such understandings of the state, this thesis will 
explore what role have international actors played in fostering and maintaining Libyan unity 
after 2011, and how the conditions posed by the so-called “international community” have in 
turn shaped the preferences of local actors.  
 
Methodology 
 
The theoretical framework developed earlier will serve as the backbone to this thesis 
to explain why Libya survived its shattered reality thus far and how its borders managed to 
stay intact.   
The first chapter of the analysis will build on the concept of quasi-states within the 
international order to show how the actions of the international community prevented the 
escalation of tension and disintegration on some occasions that followed the Libyan uprising. 
States no longer exist in a vacuum. They have to fit within the rules and the norms on the 
international stage, and the international community reacts to national developments and 
issues as well. Besides the theoretical part, the chapter will analyze the importance of the UN 
role throughout the past seven years and their role in brokering the Libyan Political 
Agreement and the Libyan National Conference process.  
The arguments of the first chapter extend into the second which that focuses on armed 
and revolutionary groups reactions to development inside and outside Libya. The second 
chapter will use theories on rebel governance to explain why armed groups did not choose to 
challenge the idea of statehood in Libya and what factors push them towards the ideals of the 
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state and its unity. Also, the chapter will include a section on Libyan public opinion on armed 
groups - why it is essential to consider and how it relates to the bigger picture.  
The third chapter focuses on traditional authorities, and specifically the Libyan tribes 
that continue to have a significant influence on national politics. The theory of hybrid 
sovereignty comes in handy for this portion of the thesis which aims to demonstrate that the 
institution of the tribe has coexisted alongside the institution of the state in Libya. The 
chapter attempts to indicate that challenging the state and its unity is not necessarily a priority 
for tribes as this could pose a threat to their interests. It will be divided into two main 
sections. One will focus on tribe-state relations and one on tribe-society relation and how the 
latter might affect the nature of the former and the choices tribal elders make on the national 
political stage.  
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolism appears throughout the thesis in explicit or implicit 
ways. In the absence of a functioning national government, and with the presence of many 
actors involved in what seems to be a zero-sum game - as most actors seem to be equally 
weak/strong - the symbolic deeds of these various players have become as important as their 
physical acts.  
In order to compensate for the shortage of academic papers and books on Libya, 
supported and supplemented through the use of news from reputable sources, survey data, 
governmental and ministerial websites and social media accounts, in addition to think-tanks 
and policy publications. To further strengthen the analysis, I have been involved in a year-
long observation process during which I have closely followed the developments in the 
country through social media, and direct interactions with Libyans through work.  The 
empirical part of this thesis rests on primary data. I had the privilege of contributing and 
accessing survey data collected by the Clingendael Institute during the first half of 2018 in 
eight municipalities in western and southwestern Libya. The survey interviews focused on 
local and security governance and the responses received fit naturally in the analysis parts on 
militias and armed groups. The surveys were carried out by Libyan local partners who have 
conducted the survey in the form of one-to-one interviews with respondents from eight 
different municipalities: Tripoli, Al-Zawiyah, Gharyan, Ghat, Ghadames, Misrata, the 
Warshafana region in southern Tripoli, and Sabratha49. The Clingendael Institute was happy 
to allow the use of the collected data in this thesis. While the theories and sources used in this 
thesis are broad and various, one persistent limitation is the lack of data and information from 
Eastern Libya. A region that is currently hardly accessible to researchers. The thesis 
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acknowledges this gap that is why the majority of examples and case studies will be on 
Western and Southwestern Libya. 
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Historical Background 
A hybrid nature of sovereignty and security has characterized the aftermath of the 
Libyan uprising, but this arrangement is not new to the country. Rather it has roots in Libya’s 
historical development as a state throughout its modern history. It is true that after the fall of 
Gaddafi, this hybrid nature has divided the country along political, social, regional, tribal and 
religious lines, but it did not result in the formation of noticeable attempts at separation or 
division.  
 The resilience of Libya’s unity during a time of extreme fragmentation is what this 
thesis tries to analyze. Thus, it is crucial to provide a brief historical overview of 
developments in the country over the past century to explain why fragmentation has roots in 
Libya's modern history and what factors contribute to the resilience of Libyan unity. 
Before providing the historical overview, it is important to briefly mention the actors 
who are politically relevant in Libya today. The list of actors include the tribes, the armed 
groups (of all variations), the Government of National Accord (GNA), the House of 
Representatives (HoR), the Presidential Council (PC), the State Council (SC), the Libyan 
National Army (LNA) under the leadership of Marshal General Khalifa Haftar, and the 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The list is composed of actors that are 
relevant during the time of writing this thesis. Many former post-2011 actors and 
organizations have perished, and it is likely that some new ones will emerge in the upcoming 
years. 
The Ottomans, the Italian Colonization, and the Accidental Monarchy 
 
  In the early modern period, the three historic regions of Libya, Fezzan, Cyrenaica, 
and Tripolitania, were first brought together under one administration by the Ottomans. The 
Ottomans stretched their authority as far as Ghat and al-Kufrah in the Libyan south. Even 
then, however, the Ottomans were only able to exert their full authority in the urban centers 
along the Mediterranean coast. For administration outside the major cities, the Ottomans 
depended on tribal elders, religious figures, and wealthy merchants to maintain loyalty to the 
Sultan and collect taxes. As a result of this cooperation between local figures and the 
Ottomans, local identities and traditional authorities remained influential in Ottoman Libya50.  
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 The Libyans first encounter with central administration and state institution happened 
when the Italians occupied the country in 1911. Initially, the Italians followed a strategy 
similar to that of the Ottomans, and they maintained good relationships with local elites who 
helped them run the country. In 1935, however, the Italians decided to exert full authority 
over the entire political sphere in the three regions of Libya. The power of the tribes, 
religious, and regional elites was diminished, and Italy constructed an exclusive governance 
system in which the Libyans played a minimal role. Naturally, the Libyans attempted to 
challenge Italian colonization. The Sanusi religious order and the tribes allied with it under 
the leadership of the Libyan national hero Omar al-Mukhtar formed the most prominent 
opposition block to the Italian rule. Nonetheless, their efforts were not enough to achieve 
Libyan independence before the outbreak of World War II51.  
 Italy lost control over Libya during World War II. The French and the British were 
able to force the Italian army out of Libya. The country was then designated as a UN 
Trusteeship. Under this arrangement, the UN gave the British control over Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania and assigned Fezzan to the French. The two countries were instructed to fulfill 
Libyan hopes for independence before January 1, 1952. The British favored their war ally 
prince Idris al-Sanusi who was able to form a semi-independent emirate in Cyrenaica while 
maintaining his close ties with Britain. Through British support, he launched a campaign in 
Cyrenaica, but also in Tripolitania and Fezzan that aimed at uniting the three regions under 
his leadership. The process proved to be long and shaky, but eventually fear of carving up the 
country under British and French mandatory authority brought all parties together. The 
residents of Fezzan preferred to join the union over remaining under French authority, and 
the Republicans of Tripolitania favored a union with the other two regions under Sanusi 
leadership over British control. Thus, and in December 1951, the international community 
welcomed Libya as an independent federal monarchy with prince Idris as its first king52.  
 The newly appointed king decided to depend on tribal, religious, merchants and local 
elites to compensate for the lack of administrative capacities in the country. The king's close 
circle of associates and tribal figures from the East, the West, and the South of Libya secured 
the most senior positions in the country and the upper house of the Libya parliament, the 
House of Elders, was mostly composed of tribal sheiks. The discovery of vast oil reserves in 
the late 1950s improved the king's ability to strengthen and expand his patronage system in 
order to safeguard his regime. In 1963, the King united the three parts of Libya under a 
central administration and dismantled the federalism that initially brought Libyan regions 
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together. Consequently, state institutions were kept weak under King Idris I and Libya 
developed into a typical rentier state in which patronage, clientelism, and favoritism 
prevailed53.  
Gaddafi’s Libya 
 
 When Gaddafi removed the King from power in 1969, he promised to bring an end to 
Libya's system of favoritism and its rentier nature. Thus, he disavowed tribalism and stressed 
that Libya's new revolutionary spirit does not reconcile with traditional authorities and 
practices. He, consequently, removed the monarchical elite from senior positions and 
replaced them with his revolutionary military companions. Nonetheless, Gaddafi's promises 
contracted his desire to consolidate his power and grip over the country. His third universal 
theory outlined in the Green Book promised Libyans direct democracy. Instead, Gaddafi 
established a firmly authoritarian system in Libya, with no written constitution, and with 
intentionally weakened institutions except for the security apparatus54. 
 Gaddafi's repressive policies alienated many of his revolutionary allies who assisted 
him in taking over power in 1969. Furthermore, the inability of the regime to deliver on its 
promises, the multiple coups against Gaddafi, the regime involvement in supporting terrorism 
abroad, and the UN sanctions against Libya that were implemented in the early 1990s 
weakened the regime legitimacy both domestically and internationally. As a result, Gaddafi 
had to fall back on tribal support to protect his position. The Colonel exploited regional rifts 
and tribal strife to direct any populist threats away from his regime. He reconfigured the 
country's administrative boundaries to divide communities and tribes. Further, he bought the 
loyalties of certain tribes in each locality through the use of public capital and offices. He 
mandated his Revolutionary Committees to implement these tactics and gave them more 
power than municipal councils and state institutions55.  
 Furthermore, Gaddafi constructed and empowered a security apparatus alongside the 
intentionally weakened Libyan army. The newly established brigades main duty was to 
protect Gaddafi and his regime. In most cases, Gaddafi appointed his sons and trusted 
associate as the leaders of these military offshoots. These brigades were scattered throughout 
Libya. The brigades had different command structures, and they were not allowed to 
communicate or collaborate. This trend can help to explain why the Libyan army crumbled 
soon after the start of the uprisings, and why the Colonel depended on his special brigades to 
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crush the rebels. It further explains why multiple regional and local armed groups were 
formed during and after 2011. Gaddafi's policies of divide and rule whether among tribes, 
regions, communities and even among security forces contributed significantly to the rapid 
disintegration of Libya after his overthrow. The seeds for fragmentation were planted and 
watered by Gaddafi and his associates, and they are being harvested ever since his fall56.  
The Libyan Uprising 
 
 The Arab Spring spread to Libya in February 2011. The wave of protests initially 
started in Benghazi. Because of its strong affiliation with the Sanusi monarchy and its 
political opposition to Gaddafi, Cyrenaica was the primary target of Gaddafi's 
marginalization policies, so it was natural for the protests to start from there. Cyrenaica fell 
quickly in the hands of the rebels. Political opposition exiles who returned from abroad, local 
elites and those who defected from Gaddafi's military apparatus established the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) which represented the revolutionary interests both in Libya and 
internationally. The NTC attempted to coordinate revolutionary efforts and groups across 
Libya and to spread the revolution to Gaddafi's strongholds in Tripolitania. Misrata, al-
Zintan, and the Nafusa Mountain Amazigh towns were among the first locations to fall in the 
hands of rebel groups in western Libya. By August most of the Libyan soil was under the 
control of the revolutionaries including the country's capital. In October, Sirte and Bani 
Walid, the last strongholds of Gaddafi, were brought under revolutionary authority57.  
 The collapse of the Libyan state built around Gaddafi’s charisma exposed the 
country’s profoundly rooted fragmentation. Real coercive power was concentrated in the 
hands of revolutionary armed groups which were hostile towards anything or anyone 
associated with the previous regime. Many of the NTC members were former ambassadors, 
military leaders, ministers, or had some official capacity during Gaddafi’s time. Thus, tension 
erupted between the NTC and the revolutionary armed groups. At the same time, other rifts 
were developing at the national scene among them is the political divide between the liberal-
nationalists and the Islamists camp, and between tribes and communities that supported the 
revolution and others who fought alongside Gaddafi58.  
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 Brutal competition for power and state resources characterized the Libyan transition 
period, and it continued after the first democratic elections were held in the country in July 
2012. The General National Congress, elected in July 2012, was composed of 200 seats – 80 
of them were designated to political parties, and 120 seats were reserved for independents. 
The underlying rhetoric for this tactic was to ensure that no single block would come to 
dominate the parliament, and to promote political inclusiveness59.  
 Two powerful coalitions emerged from elections — the National Force Alliance, 
composed mostly of liberals and Gaddafi’s regime defectors, and the Justice and 
Construction Party that aligned its interests with those of the Islamists and won 17 seats. 
Tribal and ethnic connections, armed groups loyalties, and charismatic individuals were 
crucial mechanisms for attracting supporters for both parties. By instrumentalizing its 
alliances and its individual politicians' charismas,  The JCP was able to attract independents 
to its party politics, and it has become as influential as the NFA even though it did not win as 
many seats. The JCP breakthrough was the passing of the Political Isolation Law in May 
2013 which banned former government officials from public and political life. This decision 
severely affected the NFA as many of its members served in some capacity under Gaddafi’s 
rule. Additionally, the NFA cabinet of Ali Zidan, endorsed in November 2012, was 
comparatively weaker than the GNC, as it lacked budgetary autonomy and it was mostly 
dependent on the GNC’s goodwill. One year after government formation the JCP Islamists 
and their revolutionary allies have come to dominate the political scene at the expense of the 
once-dominant NFA which permanently left GNC at the hand of Muslims Brothers60.  
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The Dawn-Dignity Split 
 
 In February 2014 a group of anti-Islamists groups, eastern tribes, and federalists 
announced the formation of a nation-wide operation Karama (Dignity) under the command of 
retired Brigadier General Khalifa Haftar. They claimed that their goal is to rid the country of 
Islamists and radical groups. On May 2014, Operation Dignity politicians declared that they 
would suspend the GNC and they would hand over its work to the Constitutional Drafting 
Committee. The catastrophe was avoided by scheduling elections to select the House of 
Representatives (HoR) members to replace the GNC62.  
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 The election for the HoR was held in June, and its outcome was unfavorable to 
Islamists who felt extremely threatened by Haftar and established their countermovement 
Operation Dawn supported by Misratan and other western towns revolutionary forces. 
Operation Dawn launched a campaign to force Zintani groups out of Tripoli international 
airport and other strategic locations. The campaign was successful, but the fighting attracted 
fighters from other parts of Libya to Tripoli, and it spread the war across other regions of the 
country as well63. 
 The Libyan civil war eventually resulted in the formation of two governments: one in 
Tripoli composed of GNC remnants, Misratan revolutionary groups, and other western 
towns, and Islamists, and the other in Tobruk, where the HoR relocated and formed a cabinet 
government that was brought under the influence of Haftar and his war allies. It was during 
these turbulent times that the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) increased its efforts 
to formulate a political solution to the Libyan question. A long process of dialogue was 
initiated between the two camps, and it resulted in the signing of the Libyan Political 
Agreement in Morocco in December 201564.  
 The signing parties agreed to establish the Presidential Council, headed by Fayez al-
Serraj, to preside over the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA that entered 
Tripoli in March 2016 was to be endorsed by the HoR. Additionally, The Libyan Political 
agreement brought an end to the GNC and the government that stemmed from it. The GNC 
end was brought about by moving its members to the newly established State Council, a 
consultative body that convenes in Tripoli and also known as the second parliament65.  
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At the time of writing this thesis, the GNA remains to be the only internationally 
recognized government of Libya, but while the GNA has de jure sovereignty, it lacks de facto 
control over Libyan territory. The GNA legitimacy is based on two critical factors. The first 
is that it has international recognition, the second is that it was endorsed by the Libyan 
Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation, the two most important revenue generating 
state institutions in the country.  
Chapter Conclusion 
 
 The general overview provided in this chapter helps to conclude that while 
fragmentation is a reality in Libya, it has not resulted in the country's division and the state 
unity continue to be persistent. This thesis hypothesizes that three categories of reasoning can 
explain why the unity discourse continues despite the political and social turmoil. These 
categories are either political, social or sociocultural. The tribes, the armed groups, and 
Libyan politicians want to protect their interests and to ensure that they remain relevant no 
matter what the developments are on the political stage. They do this by accommodating their 
interests with the idea of unity and the process of state and institution building.  
At the same time, it should be noted that tribal elders, armed groups leaders, and 
politicians have to maintain their legitimacy and relationship with their constituencies who 
support unity. Libyans maintain strong state institutions will most likely improve the 
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country’s condition in all aspects. Economically, supporting unity and central governance 
allow access to valuable state resources that are currently under the control of the GNA. 
Thus, local actors can protect and strengthen patronage networks by promoting unity and 
state governance. Moreover, there is a realization in Libya that the state has enough oil and 
natural resources to accommodate the demands of Libya’s region, ethnicities, and tribes. 
Fragmentation, on the other hand, will concentrate the wealth in the hand of a tiny fraction of 
the population67.  
The analysis that follows will look on the GNA and its international patrons, the 
armed groups, and the tribes. It will evaluate these three groups history and role before the 
uprisings (if relevant), during and after the events of 2011. Furthermore, it will judge their 
attitude towards Libyan unity, and whether this attitude has been affected by the Libyan 
Political Agreement of 2015. The analysis will attempt to explain how the actions of the 
players as mentioned above and their rhetoric contribute to the resilience of the Libyan state 
unity, and why these actors continue to be interested in preserving unity despite their 
differences.  
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The International Community Supports Libya’s Unity 
The international community has been key to preserve the unity of Libya in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Libyan Uprisings that has caused tremendous political disintegration in 
the country. Many actors got involved in the Libyan crisis as soon as it broke out. The list 
includes the EU, the AU, the GCC, the OIC, NATO, the Arab League, in addition to many 
other states that act independently of these international and regional organizations such as 
Turkey, Russia, China, and Qatar68. Though these actors have different agendas and interests 
in the region and Libya, they all seem to agree on the need to maintain the territorial unity of 
Libya. The most active organization in the country today and the one that acts as an umbrella 
for all other alliances is the UN and its Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)69.  
The efforts of the UN in sustaining and protecting Libya's unity and political 
framework should not be a surprise to anyone. It was the UN that created the modern state of 
Libya by uniting its three historical regions; Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan more than 
sixty years ago. From 1949 to 1951 the UN was responsible for facilitating and monitoring 
the progress of Libya's transition phase from colonization to independence70. The National 
Transitional Council (NTC) that emerged in Benghazi to represent the revolutionaries and 
their interests was familiar with the UN historical role in Libya, and thus the UN was the first 
body they turned to when Gaddafi decided to use violence against the population.  
The Early Phase of International Involvement in Libya 
 
The Libyan revolution was internationalized in a reasonably quick manner. The 
speech of Abdurrahman Shalgam, Libya’s permanent representative to the UN, who defected 
from Gaddafi’s government and his deputy, Ibrahim Dabbashi was instrumental in 
publicizing the Libyan struggle among UN member states. Shalgam compared Gaddafi to 
Hitler and urged UN members states to intervene and protect the lives of Libyan people. 
Further, his speech was instrumental in passing resolution 1970 by the UNSC on 26 February 
2011. The resolution referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, 
placed an armed embargo on Libya and travel ban and assets freeze on Gaddafi and his 
family members in addition to the establishment of a committee to explore sanction options. 
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Furthermore, the UN hired Abdulilah al-Khatib a former Jordanian diplomat to mediate 
between Gaddafi and the rebels71. Al-Khatib’s endeavor was hampered by the NTC and the 
revolutionaries refusal to negotiate any deal in which Gaddafi is allowed to remain in power, 
and by the incoherent approach and actions of states and organizations within the UN 
mandate72.  
With time, it became evident that mediation between the two warring parties was no 
longer an option. Gaddafi continued to use violent means to crush the rebels while he was 
negotiating a ceasefire with the UN. This, in turn, has led to a greater insistence on the 
departure of Gaddafi by the revolutionaries and their representatives at the NTC73. France 
and Britain later joined by Italy, took a leading role in the UNSC discussions and NATO’s 
military airstrikes, while Germany preferred to remain distant74. 
 In March, France became the first country to recognize the NTC as the legitimate 
representative of the Libyan people75. The GCC countries, notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
were pushing for more constraints on Gaddafi’s regime and the adoption of a no-fly zone76. 
Simultaneously, the Arab League countries, aside from Algeria, Mauritania and Syria, 
appeared to have reached a consensus against Gaddafi, while the African Union (AU) 
preferred to continue negotiations towards a mediated solution77. Russia and the U.S. reached 
an unannounced agreement that Gaddafi needs to step-down78. 
 Eventually, the UNSC passed resolution 1973 which gave an international cover for 
UN member states acting independently or regionally to “take all necessary measures” to 
“protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threats of attack” including the 
establishment of a “no-fly zone.79” Resolution 1973 was the first one in history issued in the 
name of the “responsibility to protect,” and it allowed greater involvement in Libyan affairs 
which ultimately resulted in regime change80. By choosing to support one side of the conflict, 
regional and international organizations were able to preserve Libyan unity and prevent 
territorial fragmentation based on political loyalties - at least during the Uprisings. 
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The End of Gaddafi’s Regime 
 
Following the overthrow of Gaddafi, UNSMIL focused on the need for organizing 
elections, the UN area of expertise, to accelerate the transition. Elections for the General 
National Congress in July 201281. Western countries and the U.S. chose to support the more 
liberal National Front Alliance of Mahmud Jibril to counterbalance Islamic parties82. The 
international community hoped to promote democratic transition and unity through closer 
cooperation with Libya on security, defense, and institution building.  
It was early noted that Libya does not need financial support, but instead, it requires 
the expertise to help establish strong and functioning state institutions83. Thus, G8 nations, 
mostly European ones, and Turkey provided training and advice for members of the Libyan 
military. Further, the EU sent a specific border assistance mission (EUBAM) to provide 
training, monitoring, and guidance for Libyan border guards84.  
However, after the attack on the American Consulate in Benghazi, the resurgence of 
ISIS in Sirte, and the split between Dignity and Dawn Operations in 2014, the international 
community realized that the transition and pacification process in Libya is from over85. 
Initially, the UNSMIL broadened its responsibilities in Libya to make sure that Libyan 
territorial unity is preserved, to assist the democratic transitions, to monitor and prevent 
human rights violations, to support the role of law, improve government capacity, reestablish 
security, and to control the trade of arms86. After the 2014 split between Eastern and Western 
Libya, the UNSMIL became the main mediator and facilitator of dialogue between the 
warring parties.  
The UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement 
 
The divide between Operation Dignity and Operation Libya Dawn in May 2014, 
intensified the political fragmentation in the country and resulted in the outbreak of the 
Libyan Civil War. The UNSMIL, acting on behalf of the international community, responded 
to the situation in a quick manner. The mission organized a series of meetings among Libya’s 
warring parties in Shkirat, Morocco. The meetings extended over 14 months and resulted in 
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the formulation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)87 that was signed on 17 December 
201588. The immediate aims of the agreement were the need to put an end to the fighting that 
has crippled the political transition process and threatened the unity of Libya, and to build a 
civil and democratic state through national consensus. Other concerns outlined in the 
agreement were the need to strengthen state institutions, respect the independence of the 
judiciary, separate between the three branches of power, and protect the lives and rights of 
Libyans89.   
Notably, however, the first governing principle of the Libyan Political Agreement 
directly addressed Libya’s territorial integrity, independence, and unity: 
 
“Commitment to the protection of the national and territorial integrity of Libya, as 
well as its sovereignty, independence, and its full control over its international 
borders, and rejection of any foreign intervention in Libyan internal affairs.90” 
 
Despite their different interests and agendas, all Libyan parties involved in the dialogue 
process, and all international and Arab actors who were invited to participate in Shkirat 
meetings agreed on preserving Libya’s unity. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, 
the international community is not ready and is not willing to accept a change to the status 
quo and that what has been proved by the Libyan Political Agreement.  
The Agreement acknowledged the power and authority of the elected House of 
Representatives that chose to relocate to eastern Libya, and the so-called Islamists militias 
influential in Tripoli and Misrata, but it prohibited them from officially fragmenting Libya. 
Furthermore, the international community, through the Libyan Political Agreement, created 
the Government of National Accord (GNA), the only internationally recognized Libyan 
government and gave full sovereignty over Libyan territories and institutions91.  
Additionally, the agreement required the commitment of all signing parties to 
cooperate with the GNA and the UNSMIL and to refrain from any acts that hinder the ability 
of these two institutions to implement the agreement. It further compelled signing parties to 
protect the safety of all state-owned properties and headquarters and to hand them over to the 
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GNA so it can exercise its legitimate control over state bodies and institutions. Finally, it 
allowed the GNA to ask the UNSC to issue resolution that can empower the government, 
preserve the agreement, and support its implementation92. (17) 
The conditions stipulated in the LPA shows that the international community can 
have an instrumental role in the country’s internal affairs and it can push local and 
international actors to act by accepted global norms and values. The international community 
decided that Libya cannot be divided, it established the GNA and gave it de jure sovereignty. 
Libyan local actors, on their part, complied to protect their relevance and influence and to 
maintain their gains.  
Up to this point, the LPA remains to be the only widely accepted framework to solve 
the Libyan struggle93. Many conferences have been held since the Shkirat meetings, and 
many suggestions were put to amend the LPA, but the essences of all efforts remain one: 
Libyan unity comes; first, Tripoli is the capital, and the GNA is the only recognized 
government. Even the states that seem to be more inclined towards Cyrenaica’s strongman, 
Major General Khalifa Haftar, such as France, Egypt and the UAE do not openly challenge 
the LPA and the authority of the GNA or the fact that it is the only recognized government. 
All three countries intervened in Libya’s internal affairs to advance their interests, but they 
have framed their interventions under the umbrella of supporting the LPA and the UN efforts.  
For example, Egypt organized a meeting between Haftar and GNA PM Fayez al-
Serraj in February 2017. Back then, the Egyptian government stated that it aimed to help in 
resolving Libya’s current state of affairs based on the guidelines outlined in the LPA. In 
addition to Haftar and Serraj, Cairo has also hosted the Speaker of the HoR, members of the 
HoR, the Speaker of the HSC and its members, civil society organizations, community elders, 
and tribal sheiks94. The UAE has also invited Haftar and Serraj for a meeting in Abu Dhabi in 
May 2017. The UAE government announced that their goal was to activate all the governing 
principle of the LPA fully and to end the country’s fragmentation95. In May 2018, Paris 
organized a summit on Libya in which more than twenty organizations and head of states 
participated, including the four principal actors in western and eastern Libya: GNA PM 
Fayez al-Serraj, HCS Speaker Khaled al-Mishri, HoR Speaker Aguila Salih, and LNA 
Commander Khalifa Haftar. During the Paris summit, all actors agreed on the need to commit 
                                                        
92 LPA, p. 12-17 
93 Sami Zapita, “Palermo Libya conference makes no major breakthrough, postpone elections, reaffirms LPA 
and Action Plan.” Libya Herald, November 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/macron-
hosts-libyan-factions-in-paris-in-push-to-secure-elections  
94 El-Watan News (Arabic) – July 2017: https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/2356199  
95 Ibid 
 33 
to the LPA and to work for organizing elections to end the country’s political 
fragmentation96.   
States that are more favorable of the GNA have held conferences on Libya as well. 
The latest of such events was Italy’s imitative that took place in Palermo in November 2018. 
Even though Italy does not share the same vision with France, the UAE, and Egypt, the guest 
list of Palermo’s conference seemed similar to the previous ones; its outcomes were 
strikingly identical as it did not present any breakthroughs and most importantly it reaffirmed 
the LPA. Palermo’s first concluding point was remarkably similar to that of the LPA signed 
in Morocco two years earlier, “[participants] Reaffirming their strong and unequivocal 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of 
Libya;” further it stressed that “… the December 17, 2015, Libyan Political Agreement 
(LPA) which remains the only viable framework to pursue an inclusive and sustainable path 
towards the stabilization of Libya.97”  
The Use of Sanctions to Empower UNSMIL Efforts 
 
The UN first use of sanctions in post-2011 Libya targeted Gaddafi’s family and 
associates98. These sanctions were adopted and implemented in October 2014, and the UN 
did not use sanctions against individuals until June 2018. In June, the UNSC agreed to add 
six individuals who were involved in human smuggling and trafficking activities in Libya99. 
Nonetheless, the UNSC use of sanctions did not stop at smugglers. Following that example, 
the UNSC seems to be more assertive in its use of sanctions against individuals who violate 
international objectives in Libya and propose a threat to the implementation of the LPA and 
the UN Action Plan100.   
In an unprecedented move, the UNSC decided to add Ibrahim Saeed Salim Jadhran to 
its list of persons and entities subjected to the assets freeze and travel ban. A penalty outlined 
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in UNSC Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973 on Libya. Jadhran used to be the head of Oil 
Installation Guards under the Government of the National Congress.  He was responsible for 
protection oil fields, and installation is the Oil Crescent region in central-northern Libya101. 
He later split from the government and formed his militia. The LNA of Haftar was able to 
force Jadhran and his forces out of the Oil Crescent region in late 2016, Jadhran then 
reorganized and enlarged his forces and attacked the area in June 2018. Even though Jadhran 
claimed that he was acting on behalf of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj denied any coordination or 
agreement with Jadhran or his forces102. Further, the GNA, the LNA, the international 
community, and other local actors in Libya held Jadhran responsible for the tremendous 
damage to the National Oil corporation facilities resulted from the fighting103. In September 
2018, the UNSC announced that it had sanctioned Jadhran for his attack on the oil facilities 
that led to significant loses for the people of the region and the Libyan economy. The UNSC 
reasons for signaling out Jadhran were not only economic, but some were also related to his 
use of power to halt political solutions in the country104:  
“The person concerned, through his actions, is working against the stability of Libya; 
and constitutes an obstacle in the way of the Libyan parties to resolve the political 
crisis and implement the United Nations Plan of Action.105”  
In November 2018, the UNSC added anti-GNA militia leader Salah Badi to its 
sanction list of assets freeze and travel ban. The U.S., the UK, and the European Union 
followed suit by sanctioning Badi as well106. According to the UNSC, Badi, a senior leader of 
the anti-GNA Al-Somood Front armed group,  has always undermined and hindered 
resolutions for political stability in Libya. He has challenged the authority and the 
sovereignty of the GNA on multiple occasions in 2016 and 2017 to restore the government 
that has preceded it. In May 2017, he led an attack on the Abu Saleem area near Tripoli’s 
airport road. Furthermore, Badi has played a leading role in the August and September 
clashes in Tripoli as a result of which more than 120 civilians lost their lives. He led attacks 
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on the Qaser Ben Ghashir area in southern Tripoli and on Tripoli's old airport, and he 
breached the initial ceasefire agreement107.  
The UN recent uses of sanctions to single out the spoilers of stability in Libya, such as 
Jadhran and Badi, indicate that the international community is willing to take extra measures 
to enforce its vision in Libya, protect the sovereignty of the GNA and to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the country108.  
The UNSMIL Organizes the Libyan National Conference 
 
The Libyan National Conference (LNC)109 was another mean through which the 
UNSMIL advanced and advocated for Libyan unity and sovereignty. The 77 meetings of the 
first phase of the LNC were held from April to July 2018 in 43 locations inside Libya and 
abroad. The sessions covered topics relating to national priorities, security and defense, 
distribution of power and resources, elections and reconciliation. This section will mostly 
focus on the part that discusses national priorities110.  
Unlike other political initiatives that included politicians and major national figures 
only, the meetings of the LNC included tribal elders, community elders, women, municipal 
representatives, youth, parliamentarians, and civil society activists111. During the conference, 
participants expressed their frustration with the ongoing fragmentation and division in the 
country. For them, the violence, the fighting, and the chaos that has engulfed Libya is the 
worst tragedy of all others. It’s a tragedy that has divided a country whose people are united 
by blood, national identity, and kinship. The participates considered the unity of Libya and 
the protection of its borders to be a matter of paramount importance. Thus, they maintained 
that the highest national priority is the unification of the Libyan people, the protection of 
Libya’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and the formation of a single national 
government. Nonetheless, they added that the calls to preserve and strengthen Libya’s unity 
do not contradict with community or minority rights or with government decentralization112.   
Participants also conveyed that there is a need to establish a national charter to outline 
Libyan views on the identity of Libya, its territorial unity, religion, and guiding principles. A 
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national charter would help to end the current division of governments and states institutions 
which participants strongly condemned. They further called for the formation of a single 
government to break the political fragmentation and ensure the provision of security and 
services to all citizens across Libya113. Fragmentations, the conference’s partakers indicated,  
threatens the ability essential state institutions to function efficiently and independently such 
as the National Oil Cooperation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment 
Authority. Nonetheless, attendees were optimistic that national unity will be achieved based 
on Libyans shared history and heritage. The unity will then ease to remove the causes of 
discord, resentment, and strife among Libyan tribes and regions114.  
A set of fundamental guiding principles concluded the first phase of the LNC 
meetings. As the LPA, the first concluding principle of the LNC addressed Libyan unity and 
sovereignty:  
“Preserving the sovereignty and unity of the Libyan state, its territory and people are 
essential preconditions for any legitimate and sustainable solution… Shared national 
citizenship and identity unite all Libyans. However, citizenship does not exclude local 
and cultural identities… Foreign interference in Libyan internal affairs must be 
resisted through unity and compromise. Only in this way can Libya defend itself 
against nefarious interventions.115”  
The LNC, similar to many other initiatives that have preceded it, stressed that the 
international community sees no alternative for Libya’s unity and territorial integrity and this 
what it aims to push through its agenda in Libya.  
Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on how the international community has played an essential role 
in advocating for unity in Libya and how it managed to preserve what is left of it. Despite 
their different approaches and interests, international and regional actors seemed to agree that 
Libya’s territorial integrity must be maintained and that disintegration is not an option. 
Decentralization of governance was presented as a way to move forward, but it was never 
considered a substitute for unity. The UNSMIL mostly advanced the promotion of unity 
among Libyans and their representatives.  
Through the LPA, the use of sanctions, and the LNC, the UNSMIL was able to 
popularize the unity rhetoric not only among politicians but also among powerful local actors 
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inside Libya. The next two chapters of the analysis will investigate how international 
community persistence on Libyan unity, pushed the tribes and some local armed groups to 
follow suit, why they chose to follow this path, and how Libyans perceive those who threaten 
Libya’s sovereignty and unity and challenge state institutions.  
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Armed Groups Fragmented Libya, But Did not Provoke Its 
Unity  
Libya’s many armed groups with different loyalties, backgrounds, and agenda are 
among the leading causes of fragmentation according to many scholars and experts writing 
on the country116. However, none of these armed groups wanted to divide the country's 
territory - not even the federalists who attempted to promote regionalism. It is true that Haftar 
and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) effectively control the Libyan East, and he 
has been contributing to Libya's fragmentation, but even he does not try to promote 
separation, or even federalism.  
Despite the amount of dissolution and damage they have caused, none of Libya's 
significant militias have publicly supported division. As a matter of fact, many of them 
proudly hold that they are working to protect Libya against those who are damaging it - 
which is usually an actor they oppose. Haftar and his allies maintain that they want to save 
Libya from Islamists and radicals, while the western militias affiliated with the GNA 
maintain that they want to protect Libya from the remnants of the old regime117. Multiple 
underlying factors can provide an answer why militias and armed groups in Libya continue to 
uphold and publicly support the ideals of Libyan unity.    
Armed groups, many of whom are dependent on state resources, need to ensure their 
political relevance and access to economic resources. The need to sustain the group requires 
cooperation with both national and international governments and institutions. It further 
demands the ability of the group to appease the population they govern and achieve a 
sustainable relationship with them. Continuity, relevance, and legitimacy are factors 
necessary for Libyan armed groups’ survival, and they can obtain them only through well-
structured and lasting relationships with the Libyan people, their representatives, and the 
international community.  
To accurately answer the question and to outline the factors that continue to draw 
local and regional armed groups towards unity, this chapter will have three building blocks. 
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The first section will provide an overview of theories and literature on rebel governance in 
conflict context and how that relates to the case in Libya. The second will present an example 
of an occasion during which armed groups attempted to challenge international community 
objectives and GNA authority in Libya and how that played out for them.  
As most armed forces in Libya claim to be associated with one of the two 
governments, it is better to provide examples where they did not act in accordance to their 
claims and what consequences resulted from these actions instead of focusing on what they 
declare to interested audience. The final portion will provide insight into Libyan public 
opinion, how they perceive armed groups and why their views are a crucial consideration.  
Rebel Governance, Legitimacy, and Recognition  
 
Soon after the fall of Gaddafi, many influential revolutionary groups from eastern and 
western Libya have struggled to control state institutions. Revolutionaries realized that 
governance and governance structures constitute a crucial measure of sovereignty, political 
relevance, and authority118. Thus, many attempts by the revolutionaries aimed at seizing 
control over Libya’s strategic assets – notably the NOC and whatever comes with it119. The 
National Transitional Council (NTC) attempted to assert control over revolutionaries by 
enlisting them on its payroll. The NTC considered the revolutionaries to be a good substitute 
for the tremendously weakened and disintegrated police and army forces. The Council hoped 
to use them to crush ethnic, tribal, and communal clashes. Many revolutionary armed groups 
submitted themselves to the ministry of defense unit Libya Shield and the ministry of 
interior’s Supreme Security Council120.  
Nonetheless, it became apparent over time that revolutionary armed groups were 
worsening the country’s instability by either carrying criminal activities or participating as 
partisans in the local fragmentation conflicts which they were hired to defeat. The 2014 
clashes in Tripoli are still perceived as the most dangerous attempt towards fragmentation in 
which militias played the most significant role. Zintani militias loyal to Haftar in Tripoli 
announced that they would force the suspending of the GNC. The GNC was mostly 
composed of Islamists who were stricken by the results of the June HoR election121.  
Thus, on July 13, Islamists militias supported by forces from Misrata launched an 
operation against Zintani forces who have been controlling strategic locations in the Capital 
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with the aim of shifting the power balance. Clashes erupted between the two camps, and the 
fighting attracted parties from all over Libya. The events of July 2014 initiated what is now 
known as the Libyan Civil War, two claims to governance, and it created fragmentation and 
fissures among Libya’s already-weakened state institutions122.  
The international community attempted to put an end to the conflict through the LPA. 
The security arrangement section of the LPA stipulated that the GNA has full control over all 
public institutions in the country including airports, seaports, border crossings, oil facilities, 
government headquarters, and water installations, among others. It further indicated that until 
the settlement of their official status in the country, armed groups should commit themselves 
to the provision of Libyan laws and legislation and international laws especially with regards 
to the protection of Libya and its citizens. Consequently, the LPA has a created a special 
symbolic bond between Libya’s armed groups, the GNA, and the international community123.  
Few have questioned the significant role symbolism has in the control of a population 
or a territory by an armed group. As violence is not sufficient to sustain and legitimize rebel 
authority and role, armed groups (or revolutionary groups in the case of Libya) had to engage 
with the symbolic domain. Non-materialistic deeds are as equally crucial as materialistic ones 
to secure power, preserve dominance, and promote specific agendas. Accordingly, symbolic 
actions can reduce the need for force to ensure compliance and they foster greater 
identification between armed groups and their intended constituency124.  
Although; both elected political elites and revolutionary militias engage in symbolic 
activities in Libya to empower their authority and sovereignty125, the importance of 
symbolism is greater for armed groups. While governments can claim that their governance 
rights and sovereign status are based on election results and their position as candidates for a 
nation, armed groups cannot make such claims126. They further cannot take their affiliation 
with a specific group of people for granted127 – especially that states now do not exist in a 
vacuum and they have to fit within an international order.  
The international community through the LPA chose to place Libyan sovereignty in 
the hands of the GNA. International actors recognized the GNA and agreed on giving it a full 
authority which it uses to maintain central banks, issue regulations, sign contracts with other 
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states, invest in public works, take on debts, and pay for the country’s expenses128 – even in 
areas controlled by Haftar. This new arrangement drew many armed groups closer to the 
GNA to ensure their interests. In 2014, Frederic Wehrey, stated that nearly all armed groups 
operating in Libya are affiliated with the state In some way129 – this remains to be the 
situation in 2018.  
Armed groups direct their symbolic messages not only towards the local population 
and national governments but also towards aid organizations, religious institutions, the 
international community, foreign governments that may be willing and able to provide direct 
assistance and needed legitimacy130.  Different parties have competed to capture the benefits 
that come from international recognition. Acquiring international legitimacy comes with 
advantages that increase military success, political standing, and economic resources131. Even 
Hafatr, who effectively controls Cyrenaica, has worked steadily to improve his international 
reputation132.  
Case Study: How Division Attempts Threaten Armed Groups 
 
This section presents a case study in which armed groups challenged the recognized 
and accepted status quo in Libya and contributed to more fragmentation. Further, it analyzes 
the consequences and effects of these attempts.  
The LNA and its commander Major-General Khalifa Haftar took up the battle against 
Jadhran and his forces when they attacked the Oil Crescent region in Central Libya133. 
Jadhran maintained that he was acting on behalf of the GNA and that he wanted to bring the 
oil installations in the area under the protection of a GNA affiliated force. Nonetheless, the 
GNA denied any connections with Jadhran, and it did not attempt to stop Haftar from 
retaking over control. The liberation of the Oil Crescent region was welcomed by the Libyan 
public throughout the country, and by actors inside and outside Libya. However, in a 
surprising move, Haftar decided that revenues generated from oil wells and the five oil-
export ports in the area will be handed over to the unrecognized interim government of the 
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east. Haftar’s decision was met by sharp criticism from the NOC, the GNA, and the 
international community134. 
In reaction to Haftar’s resolution, the GNA called on UNSC to stop any illegal sale of 
oil as such acts will increase division in Libya. The GNA added that failure to act would have 
grave consequences on Libya as a whole and it asked the UNSC to take all necessary 
measures to stop Haftar from carrying on his plan. The NOC Chairperson Mustafa Sanalla 
stated that the UNSC resolution in regards to Libyan oil is apparent. Oil facilities, production, 
and export are under the exclusive control of the Tripoli-based and UN-backed 
internationally recognized GNA and the main branch of the NOC that is located in Tripoli. 
While three-quarters of Libyan oil is produced in the East, Sanalla maintained that oil-related 
finances are handled in Tripoli. Revenues of the NOC are sent to the Central Bank of Libya 
that covers the expenses of all Libyans throughout the country135.  
Thus, Haftar’s decision constitutes a direct threat to the interests of Libya and its 
people. In a letter circulated to the UN and foreign embassies in Libya, Sanalla required the 
UN and friendly states to stop any individual or entity that attempts to sell oil from the east. 
The chairperson added that he is confident that the international community will support their 
legitimate cause136.  
The international community did not fail the GNA and the NOC. The European 
Union rejected handing control over oil installations and facilities to the interim government 
of the east. A statement of the EU delegation in Libya stated that "The European Union and 
the rest of the international community, as set out in several UN Security Council Resolutions 
on Libyan oil, have consistently opposed any attempt to sell or purchase Libyan oil outside 
the official channels managed by the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC).137" Further, 
the EU threatened to take action against any oil-tanker leaving for export from Libya’s 
eastern region. In a joint statement, the U.S., UK, France, and Italy expressed their concern 
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and refusal to Haftar’s action138. Haftar’s closest international allies, France, Egypt, and the 
UAE did not support his decision and did not dare to violate the UN ban139.   
The strong stance taken by the NOC and the international community, including that 
of Haftar’s closest friends, left the War-General poorly isolated. Haftar had to publicly back 
down from his plan to sell oil from Cyrenaica. A three weeks dispute ended when the leader 
decided to hand over control of oil facilities and ports to the Tripoli-based NOC in order not 
cause more damage to his international standing140.  
Haftar’s decision caused the leader more symbolic damage than material one. In 
contrast, one can argue that Haftar has won materialistically by expanding his zone of 
influence, defeating another militia that opposes him, proving to the GNA that his forces are 
capable of expanding westward, and most importantly incorporating more economic 
resources under his control. Nonetheless, his plan threatened his international and national 
image as a leader fighting for all Libyans. Picking up a fight against the NOC which is the 
sole provider for Libya and its people, and handing over oil-control to a regional 
unrecognized government, could have been considered as an action in favor of fragmentation 
and against unity by Libyans and foreigners. Accordingly, Haftar managed to avoid such 
allegations by favoring symbolic views over materialistic gains.  
Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance 
Academic studies have demonstrated that civilian opposition to armed groups is 
present in every community where armed or rebel groups govern. Full resistance is costly, 
and it requires a strong desire to reject rebel rule and an ability to collaborate. Partial 
resistance, on the other hand, seems to be common among rebel-ruled societies. Two factors 
determine civilians' ability and willingness to rebel against armed groups: the quality of pre-
existing local and state institutions, and the scope of rebel intervention in social affairs141.  
Pre-existing institutions may include state institutions, but also religious and traditions 
authorities. Even charismatic individuals who can organize communities around them are 
counted as pre-existing institutions. Their legitimacy and their effectiveness determine the 
quality of these institutions. High-quality institutions are both effective and legitimate, low-
quality institutions are either illegitimate or ineffective. The scope of rebel intervention in 
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social affairs is judged by whether the armed group extends its mandate beyond security and 
taxation into the spheres of economics, politics and social relations. The extension of the 
order can be positive if the armed group engage in the provision of goods, services, food, 
education, and healthcare, or negative if they engage in activities that directly threaten the 
safety and the security of the societies and puts constraints on their freedom142.  
Generally, when armed groups limit their efforts to security and taxation, they tend to 
trigger partial resistance only. Civilian opposition targets some aspects of their rule but 
without demanding their total removal. They risk attracting greater resistance when they 
expand their influence, especially if that expansion is destructive143.  
As mentioned earlier, civilian resistance is related to their desire to resist, but it 
mostly depends on whether they can withstand. Full resistance is more likely to appear in 
communities with high-quality pre-existing institutions. While partial resistance, which is 
more common, seems in societies with low-quality institutions, such as Libya. Partial 
resistance can be verbal and symbolic. It does not necessarily materialize into actions. It is 
further characterized by a refusal of specific actions or decisions but does not target groups as 
such.  After all, a thin line marks the forms of disagreements accepted or tolerated by an 
armed group. Civilians will have to find ways to exercise their agency without crossing the 
line144.  
Survey data collected by the Clingendael Institute145 in eight different municipalities 
in western and southwestern Libya proves that partial resistance to armed groups exists 
among Libyans. As explained earlier in the theoretical portion of this section, resistance is 
hard to materialize in societies with low-quality pre-existing and when there is no ability and 
desire to cooperate. 
Nonetheless, Libyans did not shy away from expressing their views towards and 
opinions on militiamen and smugglers in questions that focused on security and governance. 
Following each question, the respondents were given the opportunity to expand on their 
answers and provide more information if they wish. Respondents’ answers to the open-ended 
questions provided more insights on the public opinion of Libyans on militias and armed 
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groups. This section presents the responses of Libyans to three questions that are relevant to 
the argument.  
In a question on whom Libyans consider to be the main three perpetrators of violence, 
more than 30% of Libyans considered armed groups to be the main perpetrators, and more 
than 20% considered smuggling groups to be the main perpetrator of violence. The 
percentage for militant groups, however, increases in the second and third category. In the 
follow-up questions, Libyans explained that other actors include war-criminals, armed 
unaffiliated persons, or specific armed groups that respondents did not feel comfortable 
enough to mention by name.  
146 
 
Whether Libyans trust the actors as mentioned below, around 85% of Libyans 
maintained that they do not trust armed groups at all. More than 95% indicated that they do 
not trust smuggling groups. The municipal council, local forces(which include tribal forces), 
the LNA, and GNA-affiliated militias are somewhat trusted by about 50% of Libyans – more 
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or less. Strikingly, 50% of respondents answered that they completely trust the security 
directorate, and more than 35% of interviewees stated that they somewhat trust the security 
directorate. The security directorate is a pre-existing institution of Gaddafi’s time that is 
equal to police forces in other countries. In the open-end questions, interviewees wrote that 
even though the security directorate has been weakened after 2011, but they still prefer it 
over other actors because it is legitimate and it works for the safety and security of Libyans – 
unlike non-state armed groups of all factions who have contributed to the increase of fear and 
fragmentation in the country147.  
148 
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Whether respondents would seek help from the actors mentioned in the graph below, 
85% indicated that they would not ask armed groups for protection or assistance. In addition, 
90% said that they wouldn’t seek support from smuggling groups, and more than 80% 
maintained the same about the LNA (keep in mind that these figures were collected in 
western and southwestern Libya that is not under the LNA zone of influence thus, the 
situation might be different in the east). About 90% of interviewees answered that they would 
always or sometimes go to the security directorate for support and protection. The 
percentages are less for the local forces, the municipal council, and GNA-affiliated militias 
but they are still much higher than those of armed and smuggling groups. Legitimacy and 
attitude towards the state were among the main reasons why respondents chose certain actors 
over others to obtain protection, security-support, and help from149. 
150 
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Chapter Conclusion 
 
Libyan public opinion, academic theories, and case studies prove that like any other 
actors, armed groups have limits to their actions. Even armed militant organizations have to 
adhere to some accepted norms and arrangements to preserve their interests and existence. As 
long as the unity of Libya remains to be the only acceptable political framework and solution, 
and as long as Libyans continue to adhere to it, armed groups will not be able to challenge it, 
and it is in their interests to symbolically promote unity. Accordingly, this chapter has aimed 
to demonstrate that armed groups, with all the fragmentation they have caused, were not able 
to challenge Libyan unity ideals - until the time of writing at least. 
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Tribes Do Not Only Cause Disintegration 
The rapid disintegration of the Libyan state after 2011 meant that other sub-national 
institutions and identities had to mobilize and fill the void. The tribe was one of these 
institutions that soon empowered itself in order to provide protection and support for its 
constituencies151. It is true that tribes play a role in the Libyan conflict, and they are 
sometimes a direct cause of certain rifts, but this is not always the case. Tribes were put in 
that position by the absence of the state. Further, tribalism and tribal identities were 
empowered because the state in Libya is currently weaker than before, and not the other way 
around152.  
International community efforts have pushed Libyan tribes closer to the state as well. 
The UNSMIL did not attempt to challenge tribal authority or distance them from political or 
national solutions. Ghassan Salame, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, has met with tribal 
elders and representatives on multiple occasions153. Tribal delegations have stressed their 
commitment to Libyan unity and the process of state-building in those meetings. Tribes were 
present at the Libyan National Conference meetings as well. Participants of the LNC favored 
the use of traditional authorities mechanisms to achieve reconciliation since Libyans are 
already familiar with it154. These practices have brought tribal interests and Libya’s interests 
as a state much closer.  
 Accordingly, the first section of this chapter aims to explain that Libyan tribes have 
supported the Libyan state and its unity on different occasions throughout the history of 
modern Libya. They have done this because they have an interest in maintaining the nation-
state of Libya despite the inter-tribal strife among them. Further, as armed groups, tribes need 
to ensure the long-lasting political relevance and societal position and to preserve their 
economic interests. The second section will use data and surveys from different publications 
to prove that even though many Libyans are proud of their identity, they still consider their 
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national identity to be of a higher value. Libyans firmly hold that tribes should not be allowed 
to run the national scene and there should not be a substantial interference between the two 
institutions. Hence, this chapter will attempt to answer why tribes and tribal constituencies 
are still attached to the state, and how their actions may have maintained the state, and helped 
in protecting its symbolic image.   
Tribes in Libyan History 
 
 Gokhan Bacik's concept of hybrid sovereignty maintains that in Arab countries the 
colonially injected model of the Westphalian nation-state had to cohabit and coexist with 
other traditional cultural and societal mechanisms that have their influence on politics such as 
religion and tribalism. These old institutions predate the nation-states that were only 
conceived during the interwar period by Britain and France in most of the Arab region155. 
Libya, for instance, received its independence in 1951, but tribalism has existed in what is 
now Libya for hundreds of years before that date.  
 King Idris, the first ruler of independent Libya, comes from the Sanusi family which 
is originally a tribal and religious order. The Sanusi order is a Sufi sect that was able to unite 
most of Cyrenaica's tribe by the end of the nineteenth century and emerge as the most 
influential religious order in North Africa. After uniting most of the tribes in eastern Libya 
and incorporating them into the order, the Sanusi were able to mobilize them against Italian 
colonizers. The tribes, under Sanusi leadership, where the first group to pick up arms against 
the Italians in Libya as early as the 1920s. Thus, the independence of Libya in 1951 under 
Sanusi rule marked an official beginning for the entanglement of politics and tribalism at the 
national level. King Idris, consolidated his reign by establishing stronger links with the tribes 
of Tripolitania and Fezzan. Tribal elders constituted a considerable number of representatives 
in the national assembly and most of the seats in the upper house, in addition they received 
the most powerful executive positions. The king maintained his dependency on tribalism to 
govern the country until his overthrow by Colonel Gaddafi in 1969156.  
 In the first years of his rule, Gaddafi attempted to marginalize tribal authority in the 
political sphere. He reconfigured the political system and constructed a new group of state 
elites mostly composed of his Free Officers and revolutionary companions. He continued 
tribalism as on the ground of favoritism, clientelism, and patronage and he promised that he 
would rid Libya of tribalism and tribal relations. However, he soon realized that this task is 
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impossible. The 1975 coup carried out mainly by Misratan tribes forced Gaddafi to fall back 
on tribes to preserve his regime and provide it with popular legitimacy. In addition to 
empowering his tribe, the Qadhadhfa, Gaddafi allied himself with the Warfalla, the largest 
tribe in Libya, and the Magarha, the historical rival of Misratan tribes and old-time ally of the 
Qadhadhfa. These three tribes filled most senior positions in Gaddafi's government, and they 
were recruited heavily in his security apparatus157.  
 Nonetheless, tribal support for authoritarian regimes cannot be sustained indefinitely. 
In 1993, the Warfalla officers were among the main participants in a military coup attempt 
against Gaddafi. When the tribal elders refused to see their constituents to be publically 
executed in Bani Walid (the Warfalla hometown), The Colonel punished the Warfalla for 
their actions. He banned families and relatives of the participants from public jobs, exiled 
them to other towns, and established a new elite-class that pledged loyalty to him158.  
Tribes in Post-2011 Libya 
 
 During the uprisings of 2011, the tribes played a major role as well. It is true that the 
Libyan Revolt against Gaddafi cannot be described as a tribal struggle. The revolutionaries 
and their demands were mostly civil; however, the Libyan tribes were essential for the 
revolutionaries final success. The initial and rapid support of Cyrenaica's tribes to the rebels 
cause gave it popular legitimacy. Furthermore, tribal networks were used to mobilize youths 
and tribal constituencies and motivate them to join the Revolution159. Many tribal leaders 
publicly condemned Gaddafi, and historical rivals managed to work together for the benefit 
of Libya and to end the dictatorship. For instance, al-Zawy Arab tribe and the Tebu ethnic 
tribes of al-Kufrah put their differences aside when they decided to coordinate their 
revolutionary efforts160. The same is true for Arab and Amazigh tribes in Tripolitania. 
Gaddafi used the tribes to create rifts and divides among Libyan in order to sustain his 
regime. But, in multiple occasions, Libyan tribes proved that their interests do not have to 
contradict the interests of their state. In contrast, their struggle against colonizers, and then 
again against Gaddafi shows that tribes were reproducing the symbolic image of Libya. 
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 The tribes in Libya in fact contributed to the recreation of the state's physical and 
symbolic image, in direct or indirect ways. Thus, the next section of this chapter will provide 
examples of tribal efforts to hold onto the state, support and maintain its image in the post-
2011 period. One would expect that in the midst of state fragmentation, the tribes of Libyan 
ethnic minorities such as the Tebu, the Tuareg, and the Amazigh would work to undermine 
the Libyan state to achieve their groups' sub-national interests. Nevertheless, this was not the 
case during the preparatory phase for the Libyan constitution draft. In 2013, The Tebu, the 
Tuareg, and the Amazigh threatened to boycott the process if their demands for equal 
representation and rights in the new Libya were not met161. They did not make these threats 
to undermine Libya as a state. Instead, they made them because they wanted Libya to be 
inclusive and to have a place for their communities. Further, the Tebu and the Tuareg have 
been historically denied access to equal citizenship rights by successive Libyan political 
regimes, but that did not stop them from making demands for an inclusive Libya.  
 The assumption that traditional tribal structures will hinder the process of state-
building in Libya will have to be dismissed. State-building cannot be achieved in Libya 
without the assistance of the tribes. Tribes can support the process by preserving peace, 
preventing conflicts, resolving pending and outstanding issues. Furthermore, tribal 
governance mechanisms in Libya can provide a frame to advance state building, fill power 
vacuums, sustain the gradual process of state consolidation. Simultaneously, the council of 
elders responsibilities can be expanded to support reconciliation, settle down socio-political 
disputes, help in IDPs resettlement, and moderate between regional rivals. Libyan tribes 
deployed their conflict resolution methods to mediate between rival tribes and local 
communities, settle issues related to property rights, marriages, inheritance, complaints, and 
even rape and murder cases. The state in Libya can choose to support and encourage the 
adoption of similar practices by all influential tribes in the country162.   
 Equally important is the tribal opposition to radical Islamists groups and ideologies. 
Libya’s tribal populations adhere to a form of Islam that is more rooted in traditions and 
culture and shies away from fundamental and Jihadist doctrines. This tribal religious leaning 
is one of the factors that explain the widespread rejection of radical Islamism and the failure 
of terrorist movements, such as ISIS in gaining momentum among Libyans163. The tribes of 
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Cyrenaica backed military campaigns against Islamists armed groups in Benghazi and 
Ajdabiyah. Recently, the same tribes have explicitly and publicly championed the Libyan 
National Army efforts against ISIS-affiliated forces in Derna in northeastern Libya164.  
The Role of Tribes In Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution 
 
The tribal attempts to break revenge cycles and to improve reconciliation prospects is 
another area in which the tribes performed the duties of the state in order to maintain its unity 
and prevent further fragmentation. Since the fall of Gaddafi, most of the reconciliation and 
conflict resolution efforts amongst rival communities and tribes were conducted by the tribal 
chiefs and the councils of elders. The thesis will provide three examples to illustrate this 
process. The two tribes of the Nafusa Mountains, the Zintan and the Meshashya, were 
involved in a violent conflict that was initiated as a result of the Libyan uprisings. The Zintan 
accused the Meshashya of assisting Gaddafi’s army in shelling their town during the 
revolution, while the Meshashya proclaimed that the Zintan were trying to expand their 
geographical zone of influence by taking over disputed lands between their the two’s 
territories. More than 2500 people were forced to leave their villages because of the conflict, 
and successive governments were not able to bring about peace between the two 
communities. Consequently, a tribal delegation of twelve tribes from all over Libya took it on 
themselves to mediate between the two parties and they successfully managed to make a 
peace deal between the Zintan and the Meshashya. The peace deal that was signed on 18 May 
2017, and it paved the way for the return of standard life practices and the return of IDPs165.  
 The second example is from southern Libya. The minority tribes of the Tebu and the 
Tuareg were involved in a cycle of clashes after the fall of Gaddafi. They both aimed to 
control smuggling routes from Africa through southern Libya and then to the north. 
Smuggling was the only economic survival option available to these communities after 2011. 
The struggle to control smuggling routes resulted in a bloody conflict that started in 
September 2014 and lasted for an entire year. Hundreds lost their lives, thousands fled their 
towns, and the conflict destroyed entire villages. Finally, a tribal delegation of Tebu and 
Tuareg elders met in Doha, Qatar in November 2015. The delegation was able to negotiate a 
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peace deal that has been able to maintain a relative peace between the two tribes since 
then166. 
 The third case is of the two most politically important towns of Tripolitania, Misrata, 
and al-Zintan. The two cities played a dominant role during the uprisings, and their 
revolutionary campaigns are what eventually brought the fall of Tripoli in the hands of the 
rebels. Between 2011 and 2014, the two towns were competing over the controlling the 
Libyan capital that was essential to ensure their place on the political negotiations and to 
maintain their military relevance and economic opportunities. Nonetheless, Misratan armed 
groups were able to kick al-Zintan military council forces out of Tripoli. Even though large-
scale conflict did not erupt later, the incident created a tense environment in Tripolitania and 
also in Misrata and al-Zintan since security threats were always on the horizon. In March 
2018, the two towns were able to achieve peace. It is true that the negotiation teams were not 
purely tribal, but tribal chiefs and community elders contributed a lot to the process, provided 
moral and traditional authority, and ensured a smooth process. What is interesting about this 
deal, in particular, is that both delegations pledged to protect and fight for Libya’s unity and 
prevent any endeavor that could create more fragmentation or disintegration. They further 
asserted that both communities should play a more active role in supporting state-building 
initiatives and work for an inclusive, civil, and constitutional state167. 
 These examples clearly show that the tribe as an organization does not necessarily 
stand against the concept of a centralized nation-state in Libya. The tribes have been dealing 
with issues that resulted from political and institutional vacuum more than before in the aim 
to block further social fragmentations. They have been trying to assist and preserve the unity 
of Libya since 2011. Thus, the best way to end this section is with the words of Libyan tribal 
elder, Khaled, "...we want democracy, law, justice, and all these 
things for everyone, not tribe against tribe, all Libyans united . . . if the law is not working, 
then the tribe works!168" 
Tribes and Constituencies  
 
The first section of this chapter explored the relationship between the tribes and the 
state in Libya, the second section of this chapter shifts the focus to Libyans and their 
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relationship with the tribal institution. The aim is to show that even though Libyans continue 
to identify with tribalism, they still hold to their national identity as the primary one. Further, 
they refuse any kind of tribal control over national bodies.  
In 2001, scholar Amal al-Obeidi surveyed Benghazi University students on topics that 
have effects on political culture in Libya. She published her results in a book titled Political 
Culture in Libya which remains to be one of the most significant and rare sources on politics, 
culture, and society in modern Libya.  A section of her study focused on tribalism and 
students connections to their tribes.  On whether students were attached to their tribes or not, 
al-Obeidi found that a large group of students were attached or very attached to their tribes169. 
The findings are almost similar among male and female students, and among students from 
urban and rural backgrounds. 
170 
Interestingly, only a small majority of male and urban background students were 
willing to drop tribal identities, while a substantial minority of female and urban background 
students were willing to do the same. Al-Obeidid maintains that in contrast what might be 
assumed by scholars studying Libya from abroad, the outcome of the survey proves that 
gender and geographical contexts are not determinants of tribal loyalties. Al-Obeidi 
concludes that tribes remain essential both culturally and socially, and they continue to have 
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effects on politics, albeit indirectly. She adds that during Gaddafi's tribal organizations and 
networks served as a substitute for civil society. The tribe was the only available mean 
through which Libyan could voice their political views in public while being able to receive 
modest support and protection. 
171 
After the Libyan uprisings and the toppling of Gaddafi’s regime, tribes continued to 
affect the cultural, the social, and the political aspect of life in the country. In a space where 
political fragmentation has prevailed, it should not be a surprising to see that Libyans 
continue to identity with their own tribes and strongly uphold to their tribal identities whether 
they are living in urban or rural settlement. However, this does not come at the expense of 
them identifying with their country.  
  
                                                        
171 Obeidi, P. 126 
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172 
 
As the figure shows, tribal identification continues to be strong in Libya. It is strongest 
in the East where 86% of respondents answered that they identify with a particular tribe. The 
national average stood at 77% of the sample identifying with a certain tribe. Nevertheless, tribal 
identification do not surpass national identification in Libya. The figure below shows clearly 
that despite the rapid fragmentation and disintegration of Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, the 
majority of Libyans in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan continue to identify with their 
country first, tribe and family came second and third respectively.  
173 
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In security and safety aspects, respondents proclaimed that tribes have contributed to 
their increase but they should not be allowed to take over state responsibility or control its 
institutions.  
174 
 
Respondents in western, eastern and southwestern Libya observed that tribes 
contributed quite significantly to safety and security in their local areas. In some cases, tribal 
contribution to safety and security comes in the shape of supporting the role of national and 
governmental bodies, such as the police and the security directorate against smuggling and 
armed groups. However, the majority of respondents throughout Libya strongly disagreed 
with the statement that tribal elders should have an influence on local police. The figure 
below illustrate that no more than 25% of the total respondents indicated that tribal elders 
should not have an influence on local police. 
                                                        
174 Id, P. 14 
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175  
When asked whether local police should be totally independent from any tribal 
association, more than 80% of total respondents in the three geographical regions of Libya 
agreed that local police should be completely independent from any tribal affiliations. The 
figure below demonstrate that the percentages were 83% in Tripolitania, 91% in Cyrenaica, 
and 88% in Fezzan, with a national percentage of 85%. Regardless of their tribal 
identification, Libyans concur that tribes should not be allowed to control and manipulate 
police forces.  
176 
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It is interesting to note that even though respondents asserted that tribes should not be 
allowed to exert their power over the police, violent clashes were between the police and tribal 
forces were considered an uncommon occasions in town were both armed bodies coexist  
 
177 
In a survey conducted by the Clingendael Institute, respondents in Ghat, Ghadames, 
and Gharyan, municipalities with a strong tribal character, were asked whether violent and 
armed clashes are common among tribal forces and other local and national actors, as 
mentioned in the graph above. The results demonstrate that violent conflict between tribes 
and state forces ,such as the GNA affiliated forces and the local security directorates are rare. 
On the other hand, armed battles between smuggling and armed groups were considered 
common.  
The respondents refused tribal interference with the state justice system as well. As 
explained in the previous section, tribal conflict resolution methods are necessary to resolve 
social and cultural disputes and promote reconciliation and mediation between competing 
tribes, political actors and communities. However, Libyan in Tobruk and Sabha argued that 
certain crimes such as murder, armed groups violations and threats, illicit smuggling activities, 
intimidation, and kidnap, among others, are better handled by the state and its justice bodies.  
 
                                                        
177 Data from the Clingendael Survey are publicly available on: 
https://www.clingendael.org/diversity_security_Libya/ (figure is my own creation) 
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When asked whether certain crimes are better handled by the tribes justice system or the state 
justice system, respondents’ answers indicated a preference for the state justice system to 
handle crimes in all three regions of Libya.  
 
179 
180 
                                                        
178 Cole and Mangan, P. 16 
179 Id, P. 21 
180 Id, P. 31 
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In Tobruk and in Sabha, two predominantly tribal towns, a low portion of respondents 
maintained that certain crimes are better handled b the tribal justice system rather than by state 
institutions. In contrast, many upholded that certain crimes are apporpirately managed by the 
state justice system rather than the tribal one. A proof that Libyans still prefer state institutions 
over traditional authorities conflict resolution methods – especially in areas that have not been 
historically managed by the tribe. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
 The resilience of tribal identities and networks does not necessarily contradict or 
undermine the concept and the resilience of the nation-state in Libya. Alice Wilson argues that 
tribes are play a role in transforming the future of MENA state through transforming and 
supporting active political participation and the distribution of resources and responsibilities181.  
Simultaneously, the Libyans who are still attached to their tribal identity, acknowledge 
that their loyalties to their country and nation come first. It is true that many Libyans continue 
to seek help, support and protection from their tribes, but they do this because they currently 
do not have a better option. The tribes remain to be a non-radical actor that can provide this 
kind of assistance. Igor Cherstich supports this view in his work on tribalism in Libya. He states 
that: 
“Many Libyans resort to tribal connections, rather than to ‘state means,’ not because 
they are culturally wired to do so, nor because they are fundamentally opposed to the 
nation state or other ideological discourses, but simply because in the current political 
climate making use of tribal means is the only way to conduct a functional life.182” 
The author reaffirms the argument developed in this chapter by maintaining that 
Libyans resort to tribal networks nowadays to gain access to services, justice, and security. 
However, and as many of the surveys’ results, clearly indicate Libyans still have a preference 
for state bodies. Thus, both the tribe as an institutions and as an organization made out of 
thousands of constituencies continue to recreate and reproduce the image of the state through 
their actions, choice, and ideologies. The tribe local governance sought on multiple occasions 
to strengthen the state and preserve its unity. This has been done through attempts at conflict 
resolution, tribal, regional and national reconciliation initiatives by the tribes, and the 
promotion of Libyan unity as a mean to ensure the interests of all tribes.  
                                                        
181 Alice Wilson, “From Revolutions to Elections: When Tribes Transform State Power,” Middle East Center Blog 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018:http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/07/17/from-
revolutions-to-elections-when-tribes-transform-state-power/  
182 Cherstich, P. 4 
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Concluding Remarks 
Building on theories of sovereignty, statehood and rebel governance, this thesis has 
attempted to prove that political and security fragmentation in Libya did not result in 
provoking Libya’s state structure and unity. Libya, as explained in the historical background, 
has always been characterized by the weakness of its state institutions and governance 
structures, but that does not make it less of a state than any other country in the world. The 
differentiation between positive and negative sovereignty, symbolic and material acts, and the 
state and its state agents, has shown that countries can exist without having strong central 
governments with functioning institutions.  
In the case of Libya, the international community played a significant role in 
preserving Libya’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity during the troubled years that 
followed the uprising. The international community, represented by the UN and other 
powerful states, was able to push local actors towards the ideals of unity in Libya. This has 
been done through holding meetings and reconciliation sessions, brokering deals and 
agreements between warring parties, and contributing to government formation processes. 
Even though some regional and global powers have different interests and agendas to 
promote in Libya, but they all seem to agree that maintaining Libya’s unity and sovereignty 
is in their interest and those of the international order  
Attitudes inside and outside Libya has attracted armed and revolutionary groups 
towards similar ideals as well. These groups soon realized that it is in their interests to 
participate in this discourse in order to preserve their political relevance, ensure access to 
resources, and avoid tensions with the Libyan population. The same holds for the tribal 
institution which has a long history of entanglement with politics in Libya. Following a path 
that promotes state-building, unity, and national sovereignty has increased the relevance of 
tribes in achieving any political solution in Libya. Furthermore, by upholding to Libyan 
national principles, tribal sheikhs attempts to minimize friction with their constituencies who 
from their support and legitimacy base. Thus, promoting Libyan unity proved to be in the 
interests of local political, armed, and traditional authority actors despite their agendas and 
plans for the future of Libya.  
In conclusion, Libyan sovereignty and unity have been preserved thus far as a result 
of multiple international and local drivers to reconstruct the Libyan state after the uprising. 
The revolt against Gaddafi has unleashed deeply rooted political and societal issues that have 
exacerbated the level of fragmentation in the country. While the fragmentation has threatened 
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the state in Libya, it did not manage to bring an end to it. Accordingly, it is hard to deny that 
Libya is a disintegrated country with high levels of disorganization. It is also hard to deny 
that Libya lacks a national government that controls all of its territories. Nonetheless, it is 
equally hard to deny that Libya as a state continues to exist as it was first established and 
declared independent on 24 December 1951183. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
183 Libyan Independence Day date: http://www.embassyoflibyadc.org/in-the-memory-of-libyas-independence-
day/  
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